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1. A Wrong Without a Remedy
When State A seizes the property or injures the person of an alien-that
is, a national of State B-the consequence must appear rather strange to
so'meone unversed in the symbolism of international law. The aggrieved
individual has no standing in the eyes of the international lawyer; it is only
State B which has suffered an actionable wrong.
This simple and thoroughly artificial concept lies at the root of the
"continuous nationality" rule: a claim must have been vested in a national
of the claimant state (or a succession of such nationals) on the date of
injury and continuously thereafter until the claim is filed.1
Many years may elapse, however, before the rule of continuous nation-
ality runs its course. In the interim, some of the victims leave their home-
land-either voluntarily or driven by the very forces which brought about
the expropriation or bodily injury-some marry, and some die, leaving
heirs born on the soil of their adopted country. New allegiances and
loyalties are formed. Yet the doctrine of continuous nationality stubbornly
refuses to bury the past, often with disastrous consequences. The whole-
sale migrations forced upon people in this century, and the greater mobility
made possible by modern transportation, combine to make the doctrine of
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1Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad §§ 306, 307, 308, 309 and
cases cited (1915). Garcia Amador, Draft Convention on Responsibility of the State for
Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens, 2 YEARBOOK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 49 (1961). Lillich, In-
ternational Claims: Their Adjudication by National Commissions 81 (1962).
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continuous nationality an archaic relic which does not serve the ends of
justice.
A fairly common situation is this: State A, in its nationalization program,
sweeps up property belonging to its own citizens as well as aliens. One of
its nationals, fearing (often with ample justification) that his life as well as
his property may be forfeit, emigrates to friendlier shores and in due course
becomes a citizen of State B. Meanwhile State B has persuaded State A to
pay a lump sum for the property of State B's nationals which State A had
seized. The new citizen of State B cannot share in that recovery because
he was not a citizen when the loss occurred; he is a so-called "late
national"-i.e., too late.
Another type of situation involves three nations instead of two. For
example: a Canadian woman living in Europe is deprived of her property
by a decree of expropriation. Later, she marries an American, giving up her
Canadian citizenship. Canada will not espouse her claim, because she is no
longer Canadian. The United States will not do so either, because it
suffered no hurt when the axe fell; the property was not owned by one of
its nationals at that time. There is no international tribunal where the
unfortunate wife can find redress. She has suffered a wrong for which no
legal remedy exists.
The Permanent Court of International Justice has set forth the rationale
of the doctrine which produces that result:
In the opinion of the Court, the rule of international law.., is that in
taking up the case of one of its nationals ... a State is in reality asserting its
own right... The right is necessarily limited to intervention on behalf of its
own nationals because, in the absence of a special agreement, it is the bond of
nationality between the State and the individual which alone confers upon the
State the right of diplomatic protection, and it is as a part of the function of
diplomatic protection that the right to take up a claim and to ensure respect
for the rules of international law must be envisaged. Where the injury was
done to the national of some other State, no claim to which such injury may
give rise falls within the scope of the diplomatic protection which a State is
entitled to afford nor can it give rise to a claim which that State is entitled to
espouse.2
2Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case, P.C.I.J., Judgment dated February 28, 1939, ser.
A/B no. 76, pp. 4-5, 9. "The traditional rule that only states have rights under international
law precludes aggrieved individuals from presenting international claims directly to foreign
states." Lillich, International Claims: Their Preparation and Presentation 7 (1962). "Who-
ever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State which owes him an obligation of protec-
tion." Clay, Recent Developments in the Protection of American Shareholders' Interests in
Foreign Corporation, 45 GEORGETOWN L. JOUR. 1, 8 (1965). See also Hackworth, Digest of
International Law 803 (1943); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 314 (1955); RALSTON,
THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 161 (1926); 1 HYDE, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 314 (1945); 2 NIELSON, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW As APPLIED TO RECLAMATIONS 893 (1933); JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF
NATIONS 99 (1959); 1 Whiteman, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 (1963).
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Let us see how this principle has become firmly embedded in in-
ternational law. We will then be in a better position to consider whether it
should be nurtured, pruned, or uprooted.
In this connection it is well to bear in mind the different contexts in
which the rule may be applied. Generally, it is more feasible to innovate in
the distribution of lumpsum settlements by domestic tribunals than in the
negotiations leading to such settlements, or in the espousal of individual
claims. In short, while it may be desirable, if one were enunciating an ideal
concept of international law in vacuo, for late nationals or non-nationals to
be recognized, the hard fact is that a state is extremely loath to compensate
individuals who were its nationals at the time their grievances arose, but
subsequently transferred their allegiance to other states.
2. Development of the Doctrine
The 18th century teachings of Emer de Vattel in his classic treatise "Le
Droit de Gens" 3 echoed the medieval concept of the absolute monarch,
who wielded unfettered dominion over both people and property. In a very
real sense, therefore, an injury to an individual was an injury to his
sovereign.
The doctrine of continuous nationality was enunciated for the first time
in this country by the American Commissioners appointed to adjudicate
claims under the July 4, 183 1, Convention between the United States and
France. The Convention did not define the eligibility of claimants. It
merely stated in Article I that the Government of France undertook to pay
twenty-five million francs in settlement of claims by citizens of the United
States for seizure, capture, confiscation or destruction of their vessels or
other property. 4 The Commission consisted of three members who filed a
report dated December 30, 1835, in which they stated:
.... that the relief provided for under the Convention could be accorded
only to American citizens, for injuries to American property, and where the
right to indemnity had never been transferred to the subject of a foreign
government; that, to constitute a valid claim, the owner of the property must
have been entitled at the time of the spoliation to the protection and aid of the
United States .... 5
One of the Commissioners appended a note, stating inter alia:
The Commission required that the claim should be altogether American, that
it should have originally belonged and have continued to belong to an Ameri-
can citizen. 6
3THE LAW OF NATIONS, translation of the 1758 edition by FENWICK 1117 (1967).
41 MALLOY, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Be-
tween the United States and Other Powers 524 (1909).
5
MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS, MODERN SERIES 351 (1933).6lbid.
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For more than a century and a quarter, domestic and international
tribunals have followed the general rule that a nationality tie must exist
between claimant and claimant state at the time the claim arose and
continuously thereafter.
The United States Claims Commission created pursuant to the February
2, 1848, Peace Treaty with Mexico (The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo)
held:
No claim can be admitted as valid under the treaty which was not Ameri-
can in its origin, and which has not retained its American character up to the
time of its presentation to the board. 7
Under a later Convention between the United States and Mexico, July
4, 1868, a Mixed Claims Commission was created to adjudicate still-
unsettled claims which had been presented under the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, and claims which had arisen thereafter.8 The Convention
itself did not define the nationality requirements, but the Commission
dismissed numerous cases on the ground that the claimants had not been
American citizens when their claims arose, and subsequent assignments to
American citizens did not confer jurisdiction on the Commission.9
The doctrine of continuous nationality has been followed in connection
with claims not only of United States citizens, but also of other nationals. 10
After World War I, the various Mixed Claims Commissions established
between Mexico and the United States (1923), France (1924), Germany
(1925), Spain (1925), the United Kingdom (1926) and Italy (1927) required
ownership of the claim by a national from the time of inception to the date
of presentation." The same rule was followed by the Mixed Claims Com-
mission of the United States and Germany under the Treaty of Berlin
(1921). 12
It should be noted that the doctrine of continuous nationality was not
unopposed. Although the above Commissions and the United States De-
partment of State adhered to the rule, its rigid application had been criti-
cized in 1915 by Borchard:
If it is the injury to the state in the person of its citizen which justifies
diplomatic interposition, the mere fact that the claim subsequently by oper-
73 MOORE, International Arbitrations 2386 (1898) (Slocum's case) and 2388 (Dimond's
case).
81 MALLOY, supra note 4, 1107.
92 MOORE, supra note 9, 1353 and cases cited in footnotes 2 and 3.
108 Whiteman, Digest of International Law, 1234, 1235 (1967).
"
1
FELLER, THE MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSIONS (1923- 1934), 96 et seq. (1935); Special
Mexican Claims Commission Report to the Secretary of State 17 (1940); American-Mexican
Claims Commission Report to the Secretary of State, 194, 195, 196 (1947).
1
2Mixed Claims Commission United States-Germany: Decisions and Opinions 176- 177
(1928).
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ation of law passes into the hands of alien heirs would not seem to modify the
injury to the state.1 3
The peace treaties concluded after World War I I between the Allied and
Associated Powers and Italy,14 Bulgaria,15 Hungary' 6 and Rumania 17 pro-
vided for the restoration of property, rights and interests taken from
"United Nations nationals" and for the payment of compensation where
the property could not be restored, or where war damage losses had been
suffered.' 8 "United Nations nationals" were defined as "individuals who
were nationals of any. of the United Nations, or corporations which were
organized under the laws of any of the United Nations, at the the coming
into force" of each Treaty, provided the said individuals or corporations
had the same status on the date of the armistice with that nation. This was
a slight softening of the strict rule of continuous nationality, inasmuch as
protection was extended to claimants who were not nationals of the es-
pousing state on the date of the loss, but acquired such nationality before
the armistice was signed.
Moreover, these treaties took a giant step by equating, for this pur-
pose, nationality in any of the United Nations. Thus, a claimant who had,
for example, British nationality at the time of his loss, French nationality at
the time of the armistice, and American nationality at the time the treaty
became effective would not be disqualified on the ground that his nation-
ality was not continuous. The subsequent treaty arrangements with Ger-
many did not follow these models.
In the aftermath of World War I1, several East European states made
lump-sum payments for the expropriated property of foreign nationals. 19
Each of these agreements stipulated that the property must have been
owned by nationals of the espousing state on the date it was nationalized. 20
'
3 Borchard, op. cit., note 1, 630.
'461 Stat. 1245 (1947); 42 Amer. Jour. Int. Law Supp. 47 (1948).
'161 Stat. 1915 (1947); 42 Amer. Jour. Int. Law Supp. 179 (1948).
1661 Stat. 2065 (1947); 42 Amer. Jour. Int. Law Supp. 225 (1948).
1761 Stat. 1757 (1947); 42 Amer. Jour. int. Law Supp. 252 (1948).
'
8 Article 78 of the Peace Treaty with Italy, Article 23 of the Treaty with Bulgaria,
Article 26 of the Treaty with Hungary, and Article 24 of the Treaty with Rumania.
19Lillich, Eligible Claims Under Lump-Sum Settlements, 43 INDIANA L. JOUR. 817-821
(1968).
20 Shortly after World War 11 the following states concluded lump-sum agreements for the
compensation of nationalization claims:
April 12, 1947 Sweden- Yugoslavia
March 19, 1948 France-Poland
July 19, 1948 U.S.-Yugoslavia
September 27, 1948 Switzerland- Yugoslavia
December 23, 1948 U.K.-Yugoslavia
January 14, 1949 U.K.-Poland
June 25, 1949 Switzerland- Poland
September 28, 1949 U.K.-Czechoslovakia
November 16, 1949 Sweden- Poland
December 12, 1949 Switzerland- Czechoslovakia
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The Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia of July 19,
1948,21 was limited to claimants who were United States nationals at the
time their property was taken. Nothing was said about continuous nation-
ality thereafter. The claims of persons who were Yugoslav nationals on the
date of the loss (even though they acquired United States nationality prior
to the date of the agreement) "shall be subject to compensation by the
Government of Yugoslavia, either by direct negotiations between the Gov-
ernment and the respective claimants, or under compensation procedures
prescribed by Yugoslav law." 22
The International Claims Settlement Act of 194923 established a United
States Commission to adjudicate claims of "nationals of the United States
included within the terms of the Yugoslav Claims Agreement of 1948."24
Nothing was said about continuous nationality except that "the applicable
principles of international law" shall apply.2 5
Claim of Jerko Bogovich et a/26 was a case in which Yugoslavia had
nationalized property of an American citizen who died shortly before the
date of the Agreement, leaving heirs who were Yugoslav nationals. The
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC)2 7 denied the claim on the
ground that the thread of continuous United States nationality had been
broken. Following "the applicable principles of international law," the
Commission held that a "claim ordinarily must continue to be national at
the time of presentation, by the weight of authority."
However, the Commission did not stop there. Although the claim had
lost its United States nationality prior to filing, the Commission went on to
June 2, 1950 France- Czechoslovakia
June 12. 1950 France- Hungary
July 19, 1950 Switzerland-Hungary
April 14, 1951 France-Yugoslavia
September 22, 1955 U.K.-Bulgaria
See also: BINDSCHEDLER, VERSTAATLICHUNOSMABNAHMEN UND ENTSCHADIGUNGSPFLICHT
NACH V)LKERRECHT 115- 117 (1950).2 1T.I.A.S. 1803, 62 Stat. 2658 (1948).
2 2Article 3.2 3Public Law 81-455, 64 Stat. 12 (1950), 22 U.S.C. §1621 (1964).
24The Act in § 4(a) also gave the Commission jurisdiction to adjudicate claims under any
en bloc settlement which might thereafter be entered into with any foreign government.
251d.
26Docket No. Y-1757, Decision No. Y-857 (1954); FCSC DECISIONS & ANNOTATIONS
13 (1968).27The War Claims Commission, an independent agency, was created by the War Claims
Act of 1948. Public Law 80-896, 62 Stat. 1240, (1948) 50 U.S.C. App. § 2001 (1964). The
International Claims Commission was created as part of the Department of State by the
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949. Public Law 81-455, 64 Stat. 12 (1950) 22
U.S.C. §1621 (1964). In 1954 these two Commissions were abolished, and their functions
transferred to the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States, the present
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 5
Continuous Nationality in International Claims
say that a claim must retain its national character "until its settlement or
decision," thus extending the requirement of continuous nationality to a
later point in time. The FCSC relied upon (a) an explanatory note in the
Department of State Application Form; (b) and unpublished letter by the
Department of State to an attorney; (c) the Department's abandonment of
a claim it was espousing on behalf of a United States citizen when he died
leaving his Japanese wife as his sole heir; and (d) an unpublished decision
by the British-Mexican Mixed Claims Commission.
In 1955, Congress added Title III to the International Claims Set-
tlement Act, directing the Commission to adjudicate "in accordance with
applicable substantive law, including international law," the claims of "na-
tionals of the United States" against the Governments of Bulgaria, Hun-
gary, Rumania, Italy and the Soviet Union.28 The Commission interpreted
this statutory language as requiring adherence to the rule of continuous
nationality, holding:
Under well established principles of international law, unless otherwise
provided by treaty, in order for a claim espoused by the United States to be
compensable, the property upon which it is based must have been owned by a
national or nationals of the United States at the time of loss, and the claim
which arose from such loss must have been owned by a United States
national or nationals continuously thereafter.29
Title IV of the International Claims Settlement Act, added in 1958,
dealt with claims against Czechoslovakia. It provided:
A claim ... shall not be allowed unless the property upon which the claim
is based was owned by a national of the United States on the date of
nationalization or other taking thereof and unless the claim has been held by a
national of the United States continuously thereafter until the date of filing
with the Commission.-0
Thus, Congress ratified the practice of the Commission by clearly estab-
lishing the principle of continuous nationality. When a person having a
claim against Czechoslovakia died prior to the filing of the claim, the
Commission limited the award to the interests beneficially owned by in-
heritors who were United States nationals. 31
A new complication was created by the Polish Claims Agreement of
July 16, 1960,32 which apparently shortened the necessary period of con-
independent national claims tribunal. Reorganization Plan No. I of 1954, 68 Stat. 1279, 19
Fed. Reg. 3985.2 8Public Law 84-285 (1955); 22 U.S.C. 9 1641-1641q (1964).
29 Claim of Margot Factor, Claim No. RUM 30214, Decision No. RUM-30 (1957),
FCSC DECISIONS & ANNOTATIONS 159, 168 (1968).
"°Public Law 85-604, 72 Stat. 527 (1958); 22 U.S.C §§1642- 1642 (1964).
31Claim of National Bank of Westchester, White Plains, as Adminstrator With the Will
Annexed, Estate of Meta Blum, Deceased, Claim No. CZ-1872, Decision No. CZ-3312
(1962), 17 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 251 (July-Dec. 1962).32T.I.A.S., No. 4545, 1I U. S. TREATIES 1953 (1960).
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tinuous nationality by requiring that claims need be owned by United
States nationals from the date the property was taken only "to the date of
entry into force of the Agreement.1 33 Despite this clear language the
FCSC gave no effect to the relaxation introduced by the Polish Claims
Agreement:
The statutory authority for administering the Polish Claims Program was
Title I of the International Claims Settlement Act, which vested the Com-
mission with jurisdiction to adjudicate claims "within the terms of any
claims agreement hereafter concluded between the Government of the
United States and a foreign government."'34 The statute further declared:
In the decision of claims under this title, the Commission shall apply the
following in the following order: (1) The provisions of the applicable claims
agreement as provided in this subsection; and (2) the applicable principles of
international law, justice, and equity.35
Although "the provisions of the applicable claims agreement" -the first
criterion stipulated by the statute-clearly declared that the last date when
the claim need be owned by a United States national was the date of the
agreement, the FCSC in Claim of Richard 0. Graw, Executor of the
Estate of Oscar Meyer, Deceased36 simply ignored this provision and
proceeded directly to the second criterion, "applicable principles of in-
ternational law." Having leaped the hurdle by taking no notice of its
existence, the Commission found itself again on a solid footing. Citing Title
IV of the Act, which stated that a claim against Czechoslovakia must be
held by a national of the United States "on the date of nationalization or
other taking ... and . .. continuously thereafter until the date of filing with
this Commission," 37 the Commission held:
It follows [sic] that claims within the purview of the Polish Claims Agree-
ment of 1960, determined by the Commission in accordance with applicable
principles of international law as provided by Section 4, Title I of the
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as amended, must have been
owned by United States nationals on the date of inception and continuously
to the date of filing with this Commission.
The Yugoslav Claims Agreement of November 5, 1964, 3 used language
similar to that in the Polish Claims Agreement, fixing the last date on
which a claim must have been owned by a United States national as "the
date of this agreement." 39 The FCSC, in Claim of Nenad Popovic, Execu-
33Annex, Par. A, incorporated as an integral part of the Agreement by Article 7.
34§ 4 (a), Public Law 81-455, 64 Stat, 12 (1950), 22 U.S.C. § 1621-1627 (1964).
351d.36Claim No. PO-7595, Decision No. PO-8583 (July 28, 1965; 23 FCSC Semi-ann. Rep.
52 (July-Dec. 1965).
37§ 405, Public Law 85-604, 72 Stat. 527, 22 U.S.C. § 1642- 1642p (1964).
38T.I.A.S., No. 5750, 16 U. S. Treaties 1 (1964).39Article II.
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tor of the Estate of Milord A. Mihailovic,40 followed its own decision in
Claim of Richard 0. Graw rather than the Agreement, and denied a claim
filed on behalf of the non-United States heirs of a United States national
who died after the date of the Agreement but before filing a claim.
The Commission added another ground for reaching this con-
clusion-the provision in Section 5 of Title I of the International Claims
Settlement Act 4 ' that the Commission shall certify to the Secretary of the
Treasury "awards made in favor of ... nationals of the United States
under this title." The Commission cited with approval its dictum in Claim
of Jerko Bogovich, supra (note 26), that claims must be American-owned
not only until the date of the en bloc settlement agreement and the date of
filing with the Commission but continuously until the final award and
certification to the Secretary of Treasury.
In 1962, Title II was added to the War Claims Act,42 giving the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission jurisdiction over certain claims by Ameri-
can citizens for personal injury and property damage suffered as a result of
military action during World War II. Section 204 of the Act prescribed that
a claim must be owned by a national of the United States at the time of loss
and continuously thereafter until the date of filing.
If the original owner of a claim was not a national of the United States
his subsequent assignment of the claim to an American citizen does not
make the claim compensable. 43 Subrogees-in most cases insurance com-
panies-are entitled to compensation only if the claims at their origin were
owned by nationals of the claimant state. 44
Title V was added to the International Claims Settlement Act in 1964,4
giving the FCSC jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against Cuba. In the
following year, claims against the Chinese Communist regime were
added. 46 In both instances the property must have been owned by a United
States national at the time of loss, and the claim must have been "held by
one or more nationals of the United States continuously thereafter until the
date of filing with the Commission." '47
The FCSC has just begun to process claims against Rumania, Bulgaria
and Italy pursuant to a 1968 amendment to the International Claims
4°Claim No. Y2-1846, Decision No. Y2-1555 (March 5, 1969).
41Public Law 81-455, 64 Stat. 12 (1950), 22 U.S.C. §1621- 1627 (1964).
"P ublic Law 87-846, 76 Stat. 1107 (1962); 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2017-201Pp (1964).
43Claim of Gerardo Soliven, Claim No. W-19156, Decision No. W-6211 (1965), FCSC
DECISIONS & ANNOTATIONS 569 (1968).
"4FELLER, THE MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSIONS (1923- 1934) -112 (1935) and cases cited
therein. See cases cited in FCSC DECISIONS & ANNOTATIONS 597 (1968) and Lillich,
International Claims: Their Adjudication by National Commissions 96 (1962).
"Public Law 88-666, 78 Stat. 1110 (1964).
"Public Law 89-780, 80 Stat. 1365 (1965).
47§ 504(a).
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Settlement Act.48 The amendment implements the Claims Agreement with
Rumania dated March 30, 1960, 4 9 and the Claims Agreement with Bulgaria
dated July 2, 1963.50 The Rumanian Agreement requires United States
nationality on the date the claim arose, but is silent on continuous nation-
ality thereafter, while the Bulgarian Agreement is limited to claims owned
by United States nationals "continuously ... until filed with the Govern-
ment of the United States of America." 51 The 1968 amendment also
reopened the Italian Claims Program for certain limited purposes, including
claims arising during World War II "in territory ceded by Italy pursuant to
the treaty of peace." 52 The FCSC was given jurisdiction to adjudicate such
claims, provided they were "owned by persons who were nationals of the
United States on September 3, 1943, and the date of enactment of this
subsection [July 24, 1968]." 53
The filing period for these three current programs opened on January 2,
1970, and closed on June 30, 1970.54
3. Straws in the Wind
Attempts have been made in Congress to relax the strict requirements of
the continuous nationality rule and to extend eligibility to those who were
not nationals of the United States at the time of loss but became natural-
ized later.55
Although these efforts have generally been unsuccessful, Congress has
driven one wedge into the continuous nationality rule under a unique set of
circumstances-when the lump-sum settlement proved to be larger than the
total amount of all claims which met the requirement of United States
nationality on as well as after the date of loss.
Pursuant to the Lombardo Agreement of 1947,56 Italy paid $5 million to
the United States for "the claims of United States nationals arising out of
the war with Italy... " There was no definition of United States nationals
4 8Public Law 90-421, 80 Stat. 420, 22 U.S.C. §1641b (1968).
4911 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 317, T.I.A.S. No. 4451 (1960).




5433 Fed. Reg. 112, F. R. Doc. 70-43, January 2, 1970.55 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U. S. Senate,
86th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 706, May 29, 1959; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess., June 18, 1959; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, on Bills Amending the Trading with the Enemy Act and War Claims Act of
1948, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., July 9, 1959. See 8 Whiteman, supra note 10, for details.
5661 Stat. 3962 (1947), Article'll.
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although Italian nationals were defined as those who had that status "at the
time of the coming into force of this Memorandum of Understanding.' 5 7
The Lombardo Agreement of 1947 was implemented by Title III of the
International Claims Settlement Act, enacted in 1955.58 Section 304 pro-
vided:
The Commission shall receive and determine, in accordance with the
Memorandum of Understanding and applicable substantive law, including
international law, the validity and amount of claims of nationals of the United
States against the Government of Italy arising out of the War.
In 1958, a second sentence was added to Section 304:
Upon payment of the principal amounts (without interest) of all awards
from the Italian Claims Fund ... the Commission shall determine the validity
and amount of any claim under this section by any natural person who was a
citizen of the United States on thedate of enactment of this title. 59
Thus, for the first time, late nationals were recognized, even though they
were invited to share only what was left after full payment to claimants
who were United States nationals at the date of loss. Under this program,
482 awards were made in the principal amount of $2,730,146 plus
accrued interest of $929,165. After the program was completed and all
costs deducted, there was an unexpended balance of $1,088,623.60 Since
the Lombardo Agreement did not contain a reverter clause, this money
remained in the Treasury of the United States. Faced with the problem of
what to do with it, Congress in 1968 added a new subsection (b) to Section
304, directing the Commission to "receive and determine or redetermine"
the claims of "persons who were eligible to file claims under the first
sentence of subsection (a) of this section ... but failed to file such
claims ... within the limit of time required therefor."'6 1
It would seem that late nationals will not be permitted to share in the
undistributed balance of the Italian Claims Fund, because their eligibility
stems from the second sentence rather than the first sentence of Section
304. The door which had been opened to late nationals just a crack in 1958
was slammed shut in 1968.
When Congress passed the 1968 amendment to the International Claims
Settlement Act, it did not follow the recommendation in Sohn & Baxter,
Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries
to Aliens (1961):
571d., Article i1.58Public Law 84-285, 69 Stat. 570 (1955).59Public Law 85-604, 72 Stat. 531 (1958); 22 U.S.C. § 1641 (1964).60Rode, The 1968 Amendments to the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 63
AMER. JOUR. INTERNAT'L LAW 296 (1969).
61Public Law 90-421; 82 Stat. 420 (1968).
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A State has the right to present or maintain a claim on behalf of a person
only while that person is a national of that State. A State shall not be
precluded from presenting a claim on behalf of a person by reason of the fact
that that person became a national of that State subsequent to the injury.6 2
The Explanatory Note acknowledges that the above statement is a
departure from the traditional rule and would extend eligibility to late
nationals even though the change in nationality was involuntary (for ex-
ample, when an alien died leaving American heirs).
Despite the prestigious credentials of the Draft Convention, it has had
no visible effect on the actions of the United States Congress or the
Department of State.
4. The Policy of the Department of State
The Department of State has steadfastly supported the doctrine of
continuous nationality. Secretary of State Fish stated in 187 1:
By adopting a foreigner ... as a citizen, this Government does not under-
take the patronage of a claim which he may have upon the country of his
original allegiance or upon any other government. To admit that he can
charge it with this burden would allow him to call upon a dozen governments
in succession, to each of which he might transfer his allegiance, to urge his
claim.63
Describing the converse situation, in which the United States might
nationalize the property of a citizen who thereafter became a national of
another country, Secretary Fish stated in 1874:
It would be a monstrous doctrine, which this Government would not
tolerate for a moment, that a citizen of the United States who might deem
himself injured by the authorities of the United States or of any State could,
by transferring his allegiance to another power, confer upon these powers the
right to inquire into the legality of the proceedings by which he may have
been injured while a citizen.6 4
Secretary of State Bayard declared in 1887:
Subsequent naturalization does not alter the international status of a claim
which accrued before naturalization. 65
62Article 23, paragraph 6, Draft No. 12, April 15, 1961. In the rare circumstance of a.
nationality change in the reverse direction, the Draft restates the orthodox rule in Article 23,
paragraph 7: "The right of a State to present or maintain a claim terminates if, at any time
during the period between the original injury and the final award or settlement, the injured
alien, or the holder of the beneficial interest in the claim while he holds such interest, becomes
a national of the State against which the claim is made."
634 Moore, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 636 (1906). The notion that a person whose
property had been nationalized would obtain citizenship in a succession of countries in order
to acquire espousers of his claim, is not only fanciful but exaggerates the efficiency of the
Department of State and other foreign offices as collection agencies.641d., 637.
6bid.
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The Department of State still professes this policy. However, one
should remember by way of mitigation that the Department, which bears
the responsibility for negotiating settlements of international claims both on
an individual and lump-sum basis, must temper idealism with practicality.
It is difficult enough to obtain compensation when the property of United
States nationals is expropriated. Another dimension is added to the prob-
lem when "the client" is a former national of the respondent state who
became a United States national after his property had been expropriated.
The respondent state takes the position, understandably, that whatever it
does to its own nationals is a purely domestic matter and will not become
the concern of another state by virtue of any subsequent change in an
individual's nationality.
However, there is a difference between rights and remedies. The latter
should be as broad as the former, but rarely are. Yet, if a right is not
recognized as such, there is no chance to obtain a remedy.
5. Dual Nationality
The concept that injury to an alien is an injury to the state of which he is
a national runs into difficulty when an individual "enjoys" dual nationality,
particularly if one of the states to which he owes allegiance is the ex-
propriater and the other is the espouser.6 6 The modern trend is in the
direction of pragmatism, affording hope that the nationality rule may be
relaxed to embrace late nationals.
The older rule of international law was set forth in a case involving war
damage sustained during the Civil War. The injured party was a British
subject under British law and an American citizen under American law.
The American and British Claims Commission, set up by the Treaty of
Washington of 1871, rejected the claim, stating:
The practice of nations in such cases is believed to be for their sovereign to
leave the person who has embarrassed himself by assuming a double alle-
giance to the protection which he may find provided for him by the municipal
laws of that other sovereign to whom he thus also owes allegiance. To treat
his grievances against that other sovereign as subjects of international con-
cern would be to claim a jurisdiction paramount to that of the other nation of
which he is also a subject. Complications would inevitably result, for no
government would recognize the right of another to interfere thus in behalf of
one whom it regarded as a subject of its own.6 7
6 6See Griffin, International Claims of Nationals of Both the Claimant and Respondent
States-The Case History of Myth in I THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 400 (1967)_ which
shows that the question of dual nationality was controversial and decided inconsistently by
national and international tribunals from 1814 to the present time.
6 7BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 422 (1962); 3 MOORE, IN-
TERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 2529 (1898).
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A tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration has stated flatly:
An international tribunal has no jurisdiction over a claim advanced on
behalf of a person who, although possessing the nationality of the claimant
state, also possesses the nationality of the respondent state.68
The Convention on Certain Questions Relating to Conflict of Nation-
ality Laws, signed at The Hague on April 12, 1930, declared in Article 4:
A State may not afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a
state whose nationality such person also possesses. 6
9
Since World War II, the United States practice has been contrary to this
rule. The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission has recognized the
claims of American nationals even if they were also nationals of the
respondent state.
Under the Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia of July
19, 1948,70 many claims were presented to the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission by naturalized American citizens who were still Yugoslav
citizens under Yugoslav law. Yugoslavia does not recognize automatic
expatriation upon the acquisition of foreign citizenship, and specific release
from Yugoslav citizenship must be granted by that government. The Com-
mission ruled that retention of Yugoslav nationality was not relevant to the
question of whether the claimant satisfied the nationality requirements of
United States law.71
This principle has been, and is being, followed without exception in all
other United States claims programs. It recognizes the equities of the
situation, for under the old rule numerous claimants with dual nationality
would have been deprived of protection. Respondent states, while recog-
nizing that these claimants were still their citizens, had not the slightest
intention or desire-and, under the respective agreements, not even the
obligation-to reimburse them for the damage inflicted through nation-
alization, expropriation, and other taking of their property.
72
6 8The Canevaro Case, Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (1912); Scott,
Hague Court Reports 284 (1916). However, where the claimant was a dual national but not a
national of the respondent state, the fact of dual nationality was ignored. In Enrique Rau v.
Mexico, German-Mexican Commission. Decision No. 51, a claim against Mexico by a person
with both German and Russian nationality was allowed. See also FELLER, THE MEXICAN
CLAIMS COMMISSIONS (1923- 1934) 98 (1935).69League of Nations Document No. 1930, V. 3; BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES
AND MATERIALS 423 (1962). See also 24 AMER. JOUR. INTERNAT'L LAW SUPP. 11 (1930).
Earlier, the prevailing view had been supported by the 1929 Draft of Harvard Research in
International Law on the Responsibilty of States. See 23 AMER. JOUR. INTERNAT'L LAW
SPEC. SuPP. 131, 200 (1929).7 0T.I.A.S. 1803; 62 Stat. 2658 (1948).
7 1Note, FCSC DECISIONS & ANNOTATIONS 108 (1968).
7 2Per contra, the Note by the Government of Yugoslavia accompanying the Settlement
Agreement with the United States, dated November 5, 1964 stated: "Under the respective
Yugoslav laws foreign nationals are entitled to equal treatment with Yugoslav nationals in
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International tribunals have not been inclined to settle claims of dual
nationals in this way, and have developed a new concept-dominant na-
tionality. In Liechtenstein v. Guatemala (the Nottebohm case)73 the In-
ternational Court of Justice held that Liechtenstein was without standing to
present a claim on behalf of Nottebohm. The Court reasoned that Notte-
bohm, although a naturalized citizen of Liechtenstein, was not attached to
that state "by his tradition, his establishment, his interests, his activities,
his family ties, his intentions for the near future."
The Nottebohm case was followed by the United States-Italian Con-
ciliation Commission set up under the Peace Treaty of 1947 in Claim of
The United States ex rel Florence Strunsky Merge v. Italy.74 The claimant
was a native-born American who married an Italian, thus acquiring dual
nationality. The Commission denied the claim on the ground that the
claimant's dominant nationality was Italian rather than American. She
resided and reared her children in Italy, and "the interests and permanent
professional life of the head of the family were established" in that country.
Although dominant nationality has not been a criterion in United States
adjudications under lump-sum agreements, the doctrine is approved by the
Department of State, which had declared in an internal memorandum:
A State is not required to recognize a claim asserted against it by another
State on behalf of an individual possessing the nationality of both States,
unless such individual has a closer and more effective bond with the claimant
State. 75
The doctrine of dominant nationality is based upon a crucial con-
cept-that nationality is not an absolute, but may be subject to degrees and
shadings. Moreover, citizenship alone is not an infallible touchstone of
what, for want of a better word, we may call loyalty. And loyalty is a
two-way relationship.
6. A Plea to Abolish the Doctrine of Continuous Nationality
The concept of dominant nationality may furnish an ideological lever for
over-turning the doctrine of continuous nationality. If, when an individual
respect of compensation for nationalization or other takings of property; consequently, claims
of nationals of the United States which were not owned by nationals of the United States on
the date on which the property ... was nationalized or taken by the Government of Yugo-
slavia will be treated by the Government of Yugoslavia under compensation procedures
prescribed by Yugoslav laws no less favorable than those of Yugoslav nationals for similar
property." FCSC DECISIONS & ANNOTATIONS 763 (1968).
731.C.J. Rep't. 4 (1955); 49 AMER. JOUR. INTERNAT'L LAW 336 (1955); INTERNATIONAL
LAW REPORTS 349 (1955).74Case No. 3, Decision No. 55, Third Collection of Decisions of the Italian-United
States Conciliation Commission 1, 12- 14 (1953); 53 AMER. JOUR. INTERNAT'L LAW 139
(1959).
758 Whiteman, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1252 (1967).
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possesses dual nationality, we apply a pragmatic test to determine whether
he has a true affinity-through family ties, business relations, birthplace of
children, domicile, etc.-with the state to which he has presented a plea for
espousal, why not use the same test in all cases, abandoning the technical
nationality concept entirely?
The 1961 Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of
States for Injuries to Aliens advocated the denial of relief to a claimant
who is a national in name only and is not bound to the espousing state by
the real-life ties described in the Nottebohm and Merge cases:
A State is not entitled to present a claim on behalf of a natural person who
is its national if that person lacks a genuine connection of sentiment, resi-
dence, or other interest with that State. 76
We suggest that the converse proposition is equally valid: a state is
entitled to, and should present a claim on behalf of a natural person who is
its national and has a genuine connection of sentiment, residence or other
interest with that state, although he was a non-national at the time of loss.
And once the eligibility of such late nationals is accepted, it would not
outrage one's sense of justice to go a step further and recognize the claim
of a person who, even though not a national, has established his roots-
home, family and career-in the espousing state and may, in fact, be
waiting out the pre-naturalization residence period. 77
The idea that a state might under certain circumstances espouse the
claim of a non-national was advanced as early as 1929 by Borchard in the
Draft Convention on the Responsibility of States for Damages Done in
Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners:
A state is responsible to another state which claims in behalf of one who is
not its national only if (1) the beneficiary has lost his nationality by operation
of law, or (2) the interest in the claim has passed from a national to the
beneficiary by operation of law. 78
Although the doctrine of continuous nationality is the corollary of a legal
fiction -that expropriation (or any other international wrong) constitutes an
injury which is actionable by the state rather than the individual-a cogent
76Article 23, paragraph 3, Draft No. 12, 199, 200, 205- 2067 7M.D. Copithorne, Deputy Head, Legal Division, Department of External Affairs,
Canada, has stated: "In summary terms, I believe that it is past time for the development of
claims rules that will lessen the gap between legal rights and legal remedies and will be more
in keeping with the evolving concepts of international rights for individuals. Such a devel-
opment need not necessarily involve the abandonment of the notion of nationality nor the
evaluation of the individual to the international legal plane. In short it is not terribly radical.
What it does envisage is a translation of the nationality rule from an irrefutable assumption to
a prima facie presumption." 1969 PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 30, at 34.78Article 15(b) AMER. JOUR. INTERNAT'L LAW SuPP. 198 (1929).
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practical argument has been advanced in its favor. En bloc settlements of
international claims usually have not produced a fund large enough to pay
all claims in full; consequently, "to add any other group, contrary to the
general practice in the past, would simply dilute what is already in-
adequate." 79
To support this conclusion, one must take the position that there are two
classes of citizens: first, those who enjoyed that status at the time that their
property was seized; and second, those who became naturalized at a later
date. It happens that most of the former are native-born Americans, while
most of the latter are former nationals of the expropriating state who chose
to come here for freedom's sake.
Other fields of law do not recognize any such distinction. All citizens are
alike in their obligation to obey the law of the land in which they live. All
have the same duty to pay taxes and serve in the armed forces, and all have
equal access to the courts. In purely human terms, the loss suffered by a
foreign-born person who later emigrated to this country is just as poignant
as that of a native-born American who had elected to risk his capital in
foreign investment. When a state negotiates an international settlement,
either individually or en bloc, it should seek compensation on behalf of all
who owe it allegiance at that time, and all should share pari passu in the
recovery, however inadequate it may be.
Looking at the evolution of law, one is encouraged to feel that even the
most firmly entrenched shibboleths are not impregnable. Ever since courts
of equity were set up to temper hidebound legal rules, the trend (allowing
for occasional lapses and retrogressions) has been in the direction of
common-sense and fairness, toward the goal of "Equal Justice Under
Law" inscribed on the facade of the United States Supreme Court. Dis-
crimination, not only in race relations but in such mundane fields as
taxation, is universally deplored if not always curtailed.
Many nations have seized American property and paid nothing for it.
Cuba alone has nationalized more than $3 billion of assets owned by
United States citizens, plus uncounted treasure belonging to its own na-
tionals. 80 Communist China has virtually abolished private property. Some
79Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Rept. No. 2358, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958). The same committee stated earlier: "While sympathetic to the plight of those unfortu-
nate individuals who were not American citizens when they sustained war losses, the com-
mittee has had to keep uppermost in view the interest of those individuals who did possess
American nationality at the time of loss. It is these persons who have a paramount claim to
any funds which may be available." S. Rep. No. 1050. 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
8
°For a chart analyzing the various United States foreign claims programs by number of
claims, number of awards, amount asserted, amount awarded, size of fund, and percentage of
awards actually collected, see Freidberg, "A New Technique in the Adjudication of In-
ternational Claims" 10 VIRGINIA JOUR. INTERNAT'L LAW- (Spring, 1970).
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Latin American nations have recently promulgated nationalization decrees,
although on a smaller scale and more selectively.
The United States has not yet obtained settlements for American prop-
erty expropriated by a number of foreign states. When the political climate
permits negotiation toward that end-and history shows that such a time
invariably comes-it is fitting and proper that our government should seek
recompense on behalf of all those who are Americans in the broadest sense
of dominant loyalty, affinity and identity-and not merely those who were
citizens on the date of loss and continuously thereafter.8 '
The United States is a nation of immigrants and recent descendants of
immigrants, and somewhere in the background of many Americans will be
found oppression in one form or another by a foreign government-foreign
in its basic view of the relationship between individual rights and state
power. When the United States magnanimously takes in a refugee, should
he not be accepted with all his assets and liabilities, including his claim to
be compensated for property seized by the government from which he fled?
If the United States, to which he now owes allegiance, does not speak for
him, no state will.
81Cf. 2 O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1117 (1935): "The most that can be said is
that before a State may be the attorney for the individual claimant, and offers its diplomatic
machinery for this purpose, it must have some adequate connection with him, one perhaps
falling short of nationality, though ordinarily taking the form of nationality .. "
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